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FORCE MAJEURE AND THE CORONAVIRUS: EXPOSING THE 
“FORESEEABLE” CLASH BETWEEN FORCE MAJEURE’S 
COMMON LAW AND CONTRACTUAL SIGNIFICANCE 
ROBYN S. LESSANS* 
 
COVID-19 presents unique challenges and opportunities for modern 
contract jurisprudence.1  Due to the social, political, and economic upheaval,2 
masses of contracting parties are seeking an “out” to their contractual 
obligations via exculpatory “force majeure” clauses.3  The implications of 
this one little clause cannot be overstated.  In some cases, hundreds of 
millions of dollars rest upon the construction of a few words in the often-
overlooked, boilerplate language of the force majeure clause.4  However, 
force majeure as a legal doctrine is woefully underdeveloped,5 and in many 
states there is little to no state law interpreting these clauses.6  Courts that 
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 1. Lydia Wheeler, Coronavirus Threatens to Flood Courts with Contract Disputes, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-
business/coronavirus-threatens-to-flood-courts-with-contract-disputes (noting that COVID-19 “has 
left companies across an array of industries wondering what to do if they can’t perform the services 
they are contractually obligated to provide”). 
 2. The United States’ GDP dropped to the lowest recorded level in modern American history.  
Coronavirus: US Economy Sees Sharpest Contraction in Decades, BBC (July 30, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53574953. 
 3. The term “force majeure” describes an overpowering event, caused by forces outside of 
human control.  Ky. Utilities Co. v. S. E. Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Ky. 1992) (citing Force 
Majeure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). 
 4. See, e.g., Complaint at 2–3, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. ex rel Dep’t of Intercollegiate Athletics 
v. Under Armour, Inc., 2:20-cv-7798 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020) (alleging breach of fifteen-year, $280 
million contract and arguing COVID-19 may not constitute a force majeure). 
 5. Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998) (“Force majeure, 
is now little more than a descriptive phrase without much inherent substance.”). 
 6. See Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 67 N.E.3d 845, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) 
(noting force majeure as a new concept to Ohio law); Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of South 
Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (observing “Indiana has very few cases interpreting 
  
800 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:799 
 
have never interpreted the force majeure clause, or have previously given it 
a cursory review, now must make important interpretative decisions.  These 
choices may determine which businesses survive disruptions in performance 
caused by COVID-19.  Even more broadly, these choices will shape force 
majeure construction and interpretation in a post-COVID-19 world.7   
This Comment highlights a largely unexplored area8 of force majeure 
jurisprudence: the unclear and conflicting relationship between force majeure 
as a contractual tool and force majeure as a term of common-law 
significance.9  At common-law, force majeure was traditionally defined as an 
unforeseeable event that prevents compliance with contractual obligations.10  
By contrast, modern contract jurisprudence developed an increased reliance 
on force majeure clauses, in which parties identify specific events that may 
excuse nonperformance.11  These force majeure clauses do not need to be 
unforeseeable to be enforceable.12   
This Comment demonstrates how these two conceptions of force 
majeure inevitably clash on the subject of foreseeability and it articulates why 
that clash matters.13  If a court presumes parties intend force majeure’s 
common-law significance to bear on the clause, the court will impose an 
unforeseeability requirement on the delineated force majeure events.14  By 
contrast, if a court presumes the parties intend the terms of the force majeure 
clause to exclusively control, a foreseeable force majeure event may still 
 
force majeure clauses”); URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 
915 F. Supp. 1267, 1286 (D.R.I. 1996) (noting “Rhode Island case law provides little guidance” in 
analyzing force majeure clauses); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crompton Corp., No. 020435, 2002 WL 
1023435, at *2 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 29, 2002) (“Pennsylvania state cases addressing force majeure 
are surprisingly few and far between.”); Erickson v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., 474 N.W.2d 150, 154 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (“[Force majeure] is virtually unknown in Michigan common law.”); B.F. 
Goodrich Co. v. Vinyltech Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (D. Ariz. 1989) (noting the lack of 
Arizona caselaw interpreting force majeure provisions). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 182 (Tex. App. 2018) 
(noting only two jurisdictions other than Texas that have addressed this area of force majeure).  
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 706 F.2d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(“[I]t is well settled that a force majeure clause . . . defines the area of unforeseeable events that 
might excuse nonperformance within the contract period.”). 
 11. These clauses are so commonplace they are often considered boilerplate.  See, e.g., 
Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1329 (4th Cir. 1987) (analyzing a 
“boilerplate” force majeure clause).  
 12. See, e.g., id. at 1329 n.1 (referencing a force majeure clause that does not expressly require 
unforeseeability). 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 14–18. 
 14. See infra Section I.C.1. 
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excuse noncompliance.15  Thus, the court’s presumption on the intended 
meaning of force majeure may be outcome determinative.   
COVID-19 has brought this inevitable clash to a head, with contracting 
parties across the nation facing pandemic-related contractual interferences.16  
While COVID-19 may intuitively seem like an unforeseeable event, this will 
likely be far more difficult to prove than it first appears.17  An additional, 
court-imposed unforeseeability requirement may prove fatal to prospective 
force majeure defenses, when force majeure precedent already suggests very 
few parties are likely to obtain relief.18  Disentangling force majeure’s 
common-law understanding from its use as a contractual tool may avoid 
increasing the burden on an invoking party who already has a steep hill to 
climb.19  More importantly, disentangling these concepts is crucial to increase 
certainty around force majeure clauses for future contracting parties and for 
parties currently contemplating judicial relief, as these parties will be better 
able to approximate the merits of their claim with clearer guidance on the 
interpretation of force majeure in their jurisdiction.20 
This Comment advocates for the Court of Appeals of Maryland to adopt 
an interpretive strategy that courts in Texas and Indiana have followed.21  
This approach (“the Texas approach”) presumes that parties intend the term 
“force majeure” to be defined exclusively within the contract, while 
assigning common law the subordinate role of filling in the gaps.22  This 
approach avoids illogical consequences, uncertainty, and the unnecessary 
expenditure of judicial resources that arise under the presumption of common 
law (“the common-law approach”).23  
Part I describes the state of force majeure jurisprudence today.24  Section 
I.A. provides an overview of the elements a party must satisfy to successfully 
 
 15. See infra Section I.C.2. 
 16. See supra text accompanying notes 2–3.  
 17. See infra Section I.A, D. 
 18. See infra text accompanying note 151. 
 19. See infra Section II.C.2 (highlighting the risk of opening a rabbit-hole of litigation if courts 
apply a common-law unforeseeability requirement to COVID-19 related disruptions).  
 20. See infra Section II.B–C. 
 21. See infra Part II.  
 22. See infra Sections I.C.2.  This approach is referred to as “the Texas approach” because it 
emerged first in Texas and was later adopted in Indiana.  See infra Section I.C.2. 
 23. See infra Section II.B–C. 
 24. This Comment will focus on force majeure and its common-law roots, as the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) does not expressly reference force majeure.  See generally U.C.C. 
(AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).  The closest reference in the U.C.C. to force majeure is 
located within § 2-614, which outlines the doctrine of commercial impracticability.  U.C.C. § 2-
614.  Commercial impracticability closely mirrors the common-law doctrine of impossibility.  E. 
Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1974).  Though force majeure is 
related to other common-law doctrines of excuse like the doctrine of impossibility, this Comment 
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invoke a force majeure defense.25  Section I.B. highlights the limited 
Maryland state precedent concerning force majeure.26  Next, Section I.C. 
provides an explanation of the differences between the Texas approach and 
the common-law approach.27  Finally, Section I.D. discusses recent cases 
across the country in which courts have interpreted COVID-19 as a proposed 
force majeure event.28 
Part II compares these opposing presumptions and argues that Maryland 
courts should adopt the Texas approach, which presumes parties intend the 
term “force majeure” to be exclusively defined within a contract, while 
permitting common-law to fill in the gaps.  Section II.A. critiques the 
common-law approach.29  Next, Section II.B. highlights the comparative 
benefits of the Texas approach.30  Finally, Section II.C. argues that COVID-
19 provides the impetus for Maryland courts to definitively adopt the Texas 
approach, in part to avoid tangential questions that may arise under the 
common-law approach of whether the pandemic was a foreseeable event.31 
I. BACKGROUND 
Lawyers and courts often describe force majeure clauses as articulating 
a “parade of horribles.”32  This is because force majeure clauses include a 
laundry list of terrible and unlikely events that may excuse a party from 
liability for nonperformance of their contractual obligations.33  Force majeure 
 
will focus exclusively on force majeure.  For a discussion of the differences between these doctrines, 
see Kelley, infra note 166, at 93–97. 
 25. See infra Section I.A. 
 26. See infra Section I.B. 
 27. See infra Section I.C. 
 28. See infra Section I.D. 
 29. See infra Section II.A. 
 30. See infra Section II.B. 
 31. See infra Section II.C. 
 32. URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 915 F. Supp. 1267, 
1287 (D.R.I. 1996). 
 33. See, e.g., Watson Lab’ys, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1113 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (referring to force majeure clauses as “a parade of horribles”).  These terrible and 
unlikely events run the gambit, as courts have analyzed large-scale events like the war with ISIS 
and 9/11 under force majeure clauses, along with smaller-scale events like a power failure at a 
wedding and a worker’s foot amputation.  Middle E. Broad. Networks, Inc. v. MBI Glob., LLC, No. 
1:14-cv-01207, 2015 WL 4571178, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2015) (holding the war with ISIS did 
not excuse delays in delivery and construction of a broadcasting studio in Baghdad because the war 
was not a force majeure event under the contract); OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 
266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1221–24 (D. Haw. 2003) (rejecting 9/11 as a force majeure event that would 
excuse a company’s failure to host a music event in Hawaii five months after the attack); Facto v. 
Pantagis, 915 A.2d 59, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding a power failure at a wedding 
reception constituted a force majeure event under the contract); Seitz v. Mark-O-Lite Sign 
Contractors, Inc., 510 A.2d 319, 321–22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding the amputation 
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clauses developed in modern contract law34 to ameliorate the harsh rules at 
common-law, in which the promisor’s obligations were absolute.35  The force 
majeure clause contracts around the common-law rule of absolute obligation 
by providing parties with a mechanism to identify specific events that may 
excuse nonperformance.36  Consistent with general principles of freedom of 
contract, parties enjoy great leeway to allocate these improbable and 
otherwise unpredictable risks.37  The court’s ultimate goal in interpreting a 
force majeure clause, as in contract law generally, is to ascertain and 
effectuate the parties’ intent.38   
Section I.A. provides a brief overview of the elements a party must 
satisfy to invoke their force majeure clauses and excuse contractual 
nonperformance.39  Next, Section I.B. highlights the lack of Maryland 
precedent concerning force majeure.40  Section I.C. describes the inter-
jurisdictional divide between the Texas approach and the common-law 
approach.41  Lastly, Section I.D. highlights recent cases concerning COVID-
19 as a force majeure event.42 
A. Force Majeure Interpretation Generally 
In a force majeure analysis the burden is on the invoking party43 to prove 
that: (1) the event in question qualifies as a force majeure event under the 
agreement; (2) the force majeure event caused the invoking party’s 
 
of a contractor’s foot did not excuse the company’s failure to replace a sign as the amputation did 
not constitute a force majeure event under the contract). 
 34. See Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) (noting the judicial 
disposition before the nineteenth century of not permitting any excuses to nonperformance for a 
promisor). 
 35. See Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 103 Md. 235, 247, 63 A. 471, 473 (Md. 1906) (holding 
that a windstorm did not excuse nonperformance of contractual obligations, as the promises were 
unconditional).   
 36. Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Servs., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 37. However, force majeure clauses may not be so broad that they make the contractual 
promises illusory.  See, e.g., Corestar Int’l PTE. Ltd. v. LPB Commc’ns, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 107, 
121 (D.N.J. 2007) (noting parties may not contract for a specific schedule for shipment and “at the 
same time include a contract term that serves as an absolute defense to any delay”). 
 38. See Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 287 (Tex. App. 1998) (noting the force 
majeure clause’s interpretation is “dependent upon the intent of the parties as garnered from the 
wording of the instrument involved”). 
 39. See infra Section I.A. 
 40. See infra Section I.B. 
 41. See infra Section I.C. 
 42. See infra Section I.D. 
 43. Emerald Int’l Corp. v. WWMV, LLC, No. 15-cv-0179, 2016 WL 4433357, at *3 (E.D. Ky. 
Aug. 15, 2016). 
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noncompliance to the degree specified in the contract; and (3) any procedural 
requirements set out in the force majeure clause have been satisfied.44 
1. Does the Event Trigger the Force Majeure Clause? 
A force majeure clause typically includes a list of specific, enumerated 
events.45  Courts construe these enumerated events with their ordinary and 
accepted meanings in such a way that aligns with the contract as a whole and 
does not render another contractual provision meaningless.46  Additionally, 
most force majeure clauses include a “catch-all” provision, which includes 
general language that may encompass more types of events than those 
specifically enumerated.47   
In analyzing a catch-all provision, courts often employ the ejusdem 
generis canon of construction.48  Ejusdem generis means “of the same kind 
or class,” and is a canon of construction that interprets a general word 
following a list of words to be similar in kind to the words in the preceding 
list.49  For example, in Seitz v. Mark-O-Lite Sign Contractors, Inc.,50 the 
Superior Court of New Jersey relied on the ejusdem generis canon to hold 
that a contractor’s foot amputation did not constitute a force majeure within 
the contract’s catch-all provision, as an amputation was not similar in kind to 
the enumerated events of “strikes . . . fires, floods, earthquakes, or acts of 
God.”51 
 
 44. Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, No. 15-025786-CK, 2015 Mich. Cir. 
LEXIS 11, at *9–10 (Mich. 10th Jud. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2015), aff’d, 886 N.W.2d 445 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Facto v. Pantagis, 915 A.2d 59, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (“A force 
majeure clause must be construed, like any other contractual provision, in light of ‘the contractual 
terms, the surrounding circumstances, and the purpose of the contract.’”) (quoting Marchak v. 
Claridge Commons, Inc., 633 A.2d 531, 535 (1993)).  This requirement is particularly important in 
considering the relationship between a force majeure clause and an assumption of risk provision.  
See, e.g., Dunaj v. Glassmeyer, 580 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1990) (“When a party 
assumes the risk of certain contingencies . . . such contingencies cannot later constitute a ‘force 
majeure.’”). 
 47. See, e.g., Maralex Res., Inc. v. Gilbreath, 76 P.3d 626, 636 (N.M. 2003) (analyzing a catch-
all provision).  
 48. See Seitz v. Mark-O-Lite Sign Contractors, Inc., 510 A.2d 319, 321–22 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1986) (declining to include a worker’s incapacitation in the force majeure’s catch-all 
provision, as it was dissimilar from the enumerated events). 
 49. Harleysville Preferred Ins. Co. v. Rams Head Savage Mill, LLC, 237 Md. App. 705, 726, 
187 A.3d 797, 809 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018) (quoting Ejursdem generis, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
 50. 510 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
 51. Id. at 321–22. 
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“Acts of God” are a unique enumerated term within a force majeure 
clause, as some courts equate the term force majeure to the common-law 
concept of an “act of God.”52  In modern jurisprudence, however, “acts of 
God” have largely been incorporated as one kind of event that may be 
included under the umbrella of a force majeure clause.53  An “act of God” is 
traditionally understood as an “unpreventable event caused exclusively by 
forces of nature, such as an earthquake, flood, or tornado.”54  By contrast, 
force majeure clauses are generally drafted to include both “acts of God,” and 
events which are within human control, such as strikes or government 
interferences.55 
The requirement that events fall within an enumerated force majeure 
event or a catch-all provision is particularly important when parties invoke 
financial difficulties or market fluctuations as an alleged force majeure 
event.56  Generally, market fluctuations and increases in financial burdens are 
insufficient to invoke force majeure.57  Courts will not presume that parties 
intended market fluctuations or financial difficulties to be included within 
either an enumerated event58 or a catch-all phrase.59  However, parties may 
voluntarily bargain for and include market fluctuations or financial 
difficulties within their agreement.60  This concept had historic application 
during the 2008 financial crisis.  Most courts rejected that the financial crisis 
constituted a force majeure event, absent the express inclusion of economic 
 
 52. See, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1328 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(referring to force majeure clauses and “[a]ct of God” clauses synonymously). 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 1329 n.1 (including “acts of God” within a list of force majeure events).  
 54. Gonzalez v. Tanimura & Antle, Inc., No. CV06-2485-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 4446536, at 
*9 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2008) (quoting Act of God, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)). 
 55. See, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc., 813 F.2d at 1329 n.1 (including both “acts of God” 
and “strikes” and government interference within a force majeure clause). 
 56. See, e.g., Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Servs., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2001) (noting that “worsening economic conditions . . . do not qualify as a force majeure”). 
 57. See, e.g., id.; Hampton Island, LLC v. HAOP, LLC, 702 S.E.2d 770, 775 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2010) (“[T]he fact that one is unable to perform a contract because of . . . his poverty . . . will not 
ordinarily excuse nonperformance . . . .” (quoting Bright v. Stubbs Props., 210 S.E.2d 379, 380 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1974))); Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234, 1240 (La. Ct. App. 
1988) (“[A]dverse economic conditions . . . do not constitute force majeure.”); see also infra notes 
58, 60. 
 58. In re Millers Cove Energy Co., Inc. v. Moore, 62 F.3d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(“Courts . . . generally refuse to excuse lack of compliance with contractual provisions due to 
economic hardship, unless such a ground is specifically outlined in the contract.”).  
 59. See, e.g., Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Co., 743 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Tex. App. 
1987) (declining to include economic changes within the catch-all provision). 
 60. See, e.g., Great Lakes Gas Transmission P’ship v. Essar Steel Minn., LLC, 871 F. Supp. 2d 
843, 851–55 (D. Minn. 2012) (comparing caselaw in which parties expressly included economic 
downturns within a force majeure to caselaw in which parties failed to expressly provide for 
economic downturns in the clause). 
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hardships within the enumerated list of force majeure events.61  As a practical 
result, the enumeration requirement limits the number of successful force 
majeure claims because prospective parties must clear an initial hurdle by 
proving that their alleged force majeure event is either specifically 
enumerated or that it fits within the force majeure’s catch-all phrase.62   
2. Did the Event Cause Noncompliance with Contractual 
Obligations? 
The second substantive hurdle to invoking a force majeure defense 
requires the invoking party to demonstrate that the force majeure event 
proximately caused its noncompliance63 to the degree outlined in the 
contract.64  For example, in Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, 
LLC,65 the Michigan Court of Appeals considered whether Chinese 
government market manipulations that affected the price of solar panels 
constituted a force majeure event within a contract.66  The court held that 
because the acts of the Chinese government did not directly prevent the 
invoking parties’ noncompliance, the Chinese government’s actions could 
not excuse the invoking party’s noncompliance.67  Rather, the acts of the 
Chinese government merely made compliance less profitable for the 
invoking party.68 
Furthermore, courts are unlikely to find an event was the cause of 
noncompliance when the noncompliance resulted from the invoking party’s 
 
 61.  See also supra note 60.  Compare Elavon, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 841 F. 
Supp. 2d 1298, 1307–08 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (holding the 2008 economic crisis was not a force majeure 
event under a contract that did not contain a specific enumerated term for changes in economic 
conditions), with In re Old Carco LLC, 452 B.R. 100, 120, 125–26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding 
the 2008 economic crisis constituted a force majeure event as it fell within the enumerated term 
“change in economic conditions”). 
 62. See infra text accompanying notes 56–61. 
 63. Coker Int’l, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., 747 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (D.S.C. 1990), aff’d, 935 
F.2d 267, 1170 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that only force majeure events that directly cause 
noncompliance may excuse nonperformance); N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 461 N.E.2d 
1049, 1058 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (noting Illinois law requires force majeure events to proximately 
cause the invoking party’s nonperformance). 
 64. See, e.g., OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1221 (D. 
Haw. 2003) (analyzing a force majeure clause that permitted cancellation of obligations when force 
majeure made compliance “inadvisable”). 
 65. 886 N.W.2d 445 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015). 
 66. Id. at 448–57.   
 67. Id. at 450.  The Michigan Court of Appeals also noted that the lower court mistakenly 
assumed the Chinese government’s actions fell within one of the enumerated events in the force 
majeure clause as an “act[] of Government.”  Id. at 447–48. 
 68. Id.  The economic penalties for the invoking party were severe, as the invoking party was 
liable for $1.74 billion and claimed the costs would force the company to leave the industry.  Id. at 
439. 
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own negligent acts or omissions.69  If an invoking party voluntarily chooses 
not to comply with its contractual obligations due to an increased financial 
or logistical burden, courts generally find the invoking party’s own actions 
were the proximate cause of noncompliance.70  Similarly, if the invoking 
party was aware of a problem or danger and did not take actions to prevent 
the event’s occurrence, the court may find the noncompliance was within the 
control of the invoking party and that the noncompliance was a result of the 
party’s own negligent acts or omissions.71 
Courts also have articulated temporal limitations for the applicability of 
a particular event to the force majeure provision in a contract.  For instance, 
in OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc.,72 a federal district 
court considered whether 9/11 constituted a force majeure event in a contract 
for a music and entertainment event.73  The court rejected the argument that 
the 9/11 attack constituted a force majeure event because even if the 
agreement included “terrorism” as an enumerated event, the connection was 
too tenuous, as the entertainment event was scheduled five months after the 
attack. 74  Thus, the directness requirement also limits the number of 
successful force majeure claims, as the invoking party’s actions are closely 
scrutinized and the temporal limitation has been narrowly interpreted. 
3. Has the Invoking Party Satisfied All Procedural Requirements 
Outlined in the Force Majeure Clause? 
Finally, the invoking party must prove that any additional procedural 
requirements expressed in the force majeure clause have been satisfied.75  In 
 
 69. White v. North, 121 Md. App. 196, 236, 708 A.2d 1093, 1113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998), 
vacated on other grounds, 356 Md. 31, 736 A.2d 1072 (Md. 1999) (noting an “unwarranted 
hardship” created by a party’s own negligent omission will not support a force majeure defense); 
Middle E. Broad. Networks, Inc. v. MBI Glob., LLC, No. 1:14-cv-01207, 2015 WL 4571178, at *5 
(E.D. Va. July 28, 2015) (rejecting argument that the war with ISIS caused noncompliance by 
blocking delivery routes, because the proximate cause was the invoking party’s failure to pay a 
subcontractor). 
 70. See Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 743 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Tex. App. 
1987) (noting a contractual obligation cannot be excused merely because performance has become 
more economically burdensome than anticipated). 
 71. Allegheny Energy Supply Co. v. Wolf Run Mining Co., 53 A.3d 53, 61–62 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2012) (holding that an abandoned gas well and a collapsed mine roof were inapplicable to the force 
majeure clause, as the invoking party knew of the problem and failed to take substantial action to 
prevent it). 
 72. 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Haw. 2003). 
 73. Id. at 1215–16. 
 74. Id. at 1224. 
 75. See Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, No. 15-025786-CK, 2015 Mich. Cir. 
LEXIS 11, at *9–10 (Mich. 10th Jud. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2015), aff’d, 886 N.W.2d 445 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2015) (noting procedural requirements may exist within a force majeure clause).  This may 
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some jurisdictions, the failure to comply with any affirmative obligation is 
fatal to a force majeure defense.76  Relatedly, the remedy the invoking party 
requests must be the remedy provided for in the contract.  Force majeure 
clauses may permit a variety of remedies, including suspension of obligations 
and cancellation of the contract.77  But, only the remedy permitted in the 
contract may be judicially enforced.78  This has become a common litigation 
topic, with parties unsuccessfully seeking reimbursements of deposits, for 
example, when their force majeure clause did not explicitly outline such a 
remedy.79  Therefore, each of the requirements for a successful  force majeure 
claim narrows the number of litigants who will escape liability for contractual 
nonperformance, and this thereby ensures that force majeure remains a 
narrow exception to the general rule that contractual obligations are 
absolute.80  
B. Maryland and Force Majeure  
States will likely face a surge of COVID-19-related contract litigation 
in the coming months81 and there is already data suggesting federal district 
courts have experienced an increase in COVID-19 related contract litigation 
since the pandemic began.82  Those jurisdictions that have little-to-no force 
majeure precedent will benefit from clearly articulating the relationship 
between force majeure’s common-law and contractual significance.83  
Notably, there is very little precedent in Maryland courts regarding force 
 
include specific notice or mediation/arbitration provisions.  See, e.g., Int’l Mins. & Chem. Corp. v. 
Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding notice by the invoking party was inadequate 
and therefore the force majeure defense failed). 
 76. Sabine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1168 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (“The failure 
to give proper notice is fatal to a defense based upon a force majeure clause requiring notice.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1328 n.1 (4th Cir. 
1987) (analyzing a force majeure clause that permitted suspension of obligations). 
 78. See, e.g., NetOne, Inc. v. Panache Destination Mgmt., Inc., No. 20-cv-00150-DKW-WRP, 
2020 WL 3037072, at *5 (D. Haw. June 5, 2020) (rejecting force majeure claim seeking return of 
deposits when the clause does not guarantee the return of deposits). 
 79. Id.  
 80. See supra text accompanying note 35.  
 81. See Jacob Gershman, Coronavirus Contract Disputes Start Hitting the Courts, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 20, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-contract-disputes-start-
hitting-the-courts-11587375001 (noting the expected “wave of [contract] litigation” amid the 
COVID-19 pandemic). 
 82. See Rachel Bailey, Continuing to Track New Litigation Caused by COVID-19, 
LEXMACHINA (July 16, 2020), https://lexmachina.com/blog/continuing-to-track-new-litigation-
caused-by-covid-19/ (observing contract law as one of the top practice areas with the largest number 
of cases, filed in federal district courts, that would not have been filed if not for the pandemic).  
 83. See infra text accompanying notes 2–7.  
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majeure clauses.84  This Author could find no case in which Maryland courts 
interpreted whether an event fell within an enumerated force majeure clause.  
The first reference to a “force majeure” in the Maryland courts occurred in 
1970, in which the Court of Appeals simply noted that voluntary actions 
cannot constitute force majeure.85  Prior to that point, Maryland courts 
referred only to “act[s] of God.”86  
Maryland follows principles of objective contract interpretation, which 
bear on the interpretation of force majeure as a contractual clause.87  
Maryland courts, like most jurisdictions, read the clear and unambiguous 
language of the contract in order to determine what a reasonable person 
would find the parties intended.88  In that vein, traditional principles of 
contract interpretation support a narrow reading of a force majeure clause.  
Additionally, Maryland courts, like many other jurisdictions, “do not 
interpret contracts in a manner that would render provisions superfluous or 
as having no effect.”89  Rather, these courts give effect to each clause in order 
to avoid an interpretation that “casts out or disregards a meaningful part of 
the language of the writing.”90  Maryland courts only stray from this 
interpretive method as a matter of last resort.91   
C. The Inter-Jurisdictional Divide Between the Texas Approach and 
the Common-Law Approach. 
As the court’s primary objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 
of the parties, a court must determine what the parties intended the term 
“force majeure” to mean within a particular contract.92  As force majeure is a 
term of common-law significance, courts must determine whether the parties 
intended the common-law definition to be imported into the contract, or 
whether the parties intended to define force majeure exclusively within the 
contract.93  To be clear, the outcome of a case may be identical regardless of 
 
 84. See infra text accompanying notes 85–86. 
 85. See Habliston v. City of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 362, 265 A.2d 885, 891 (Md. 1970) (noting 
action to remove buildings was voluntary and not due to a force majeure). 
 86. Tyler v. Capitol Indem. Ins. Co., 206 Md. 129, 138, 110 A.2d 528, 532 (Md. 1955) (noting 
a contractual obligation may be discharged by an act of God). 
 87. Atl. Contracting & Material Co., Inc v. Ulico Cas. Co., 380 Md. 285, 300, 844 A.2d 460, 
468 (Md. 2004). 
 88. Id. at 301.  
 89. Towson Univ. v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 81, 862 A.2d 941, 948 (Md. 2004). 
 90. Sagner v. Glenangus Farms, Inc., 234 Md. 156, 167, 198 A.2d 277, 283 (Md. 1964). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 93. TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 181 (Tex. App. 2018) (noting 
sometimes “contracts include terms that have common law significance”). 
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which strategy is employed.94  However, as the definition of force majeure at 
common-law requires events to be unforeseeable, and a particular force 
majeure clause in a contract may not expressly require unforeseeability, there 
is a conceptual tension that may impact the outcome of a case.95   
Thus far, courts that have addressed this question can be placed into two 
categories.96  The first category includes courts that presume parties intend 
force majeure’s common-law significance to be imported, and would require 
a high bar to overcome that presumption.97  These courts tend to impose an 
unforeseeability requirement upon the force majeure event.98  The second 
category includes courts that regard the words of a self-defined force majeure 
clause as controlling and permit common-law notions to fill in the gaps.99  
These courts, more often than not, do not impose an unforeseeability 
requirement on enumerated force majeure events.100  This Section discusses 
the most prominent cases on both sides of this debate, beginning with the 
common-law approach, and ending with the Texas approach. 
1. The Common-Law Approach 
Only federal courts have expressly advocated for an interpretive 
presumption that parties intend common-law components of force majeure, 
such as unforeseeability, to be read into a contract.101  This Author could find 
no state court that has expressly adopted this view.102  Nevertheless, a string 
 
 94. See, e.g., id. at 185 (observing that even if the court did not apply an unforeseeability 
requirement, the event would not constitute force majeure under the ejusdem generis doctrine). 
 95. See, e.g., Watson Lab’ys v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108–14 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing the parties’ dispute over whether unforeseeability ought to be imposed 
on the force majeure event when the clause did not include an unforeseeability requirement).  
 96. Id. at 1111–12 (framing the two sides of this debate). 
 97. E.g., id. at 1109–14 (holding the parties intended the common-law definition, as they used 
a boilerplate force majeure clause). 
 98. E.g., id. (imposing an unforeseeability requirement).  
 99. E.g., Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc. 861 S.W.2d 427, 436 (Tex. App. 1993) 
(“[L]ease terms are controlling regarding force majeure, and common law rules merely fill in gaps 
left by the lease.”). 
 100. Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715, 720–21 (Tex. 
App. 1987) (declining to impose an unforeseeability requirement).  
 101. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 182 (Tex. App. 2018) 
(highlighting only the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits’ cases as 
forming sides of this debate). 
 102. This is unsurprising, as many courts have not interpreted force majeure clauses at all.  See 
supra note 6. 
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of federal district and circuit court cases, relying upon each other, shape the 
doctrine.103   
First, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,104 has 
been cited as one of the earliest cases on this side of the debate.105  In Gulf 
Oil Corp., the Third Circuit held that a gas supplier could not rely on force 
majeure to excuse its failure to supply gas under a warranty contract because 
the mechanical failures that caused noncompliance were ordinary and 
foreseeable.106  Even though the clause did not expressly require force 
majeure events to be unforeseeable, the court relied on the common-law 
definition of force majeure, saying that it is “well settled” that force majeure 
necessarily includes unforeseeable events.107  This case represents one of the 
earliest attempts by a court to reconcile the common-law requirement of 
unforeseeability with a force majeure clause that does not explicitly mention 
unforeseeability.  
Second, an alternative articulation of this rule emerged in a later case, 
Watson Laboratories Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.108  This court 
articulated a presumption that all force majeure events must be 
unforeseeable, based upon its common-law definition.109  However, this court 
would permit parties to supersede the common-law definition if a bargained-
for clause was sufficiently specific, such that it demonstrated an intent for the 
words on the page to exclusively control.110  The court considered the 
boilerplate force majeure clause at issue as fundamentally incapable of 
demonstrating an intent to supersede common-law, as the parties did not 
bargain for the terms.111  
 
 103. See TEC Olmos, LLC, 555 S.W.3d at 182 (“There has, indeed, been a debate regarding 
whether common-law notions of foreseeability have any place in the interpretation of modern-day 
force majeure clauses.”). 
 104. 706 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 105. See, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC, 555 S.W.3d at 182 (referring to Gulf Oil Corp. as representative 
of one side of this debate); see also Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’ship, 736 S.W.2d at 720 (rejecting Gulf 
Oil Corp., as directly contrary to Texas and Fifth Circuit precedent). 
 106. Gulf Oil Corp., 706 F.2d at 454–55. 
 107. Id. at 452.  
 108. 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 109. Id. at 1113 (holding defendants failed to overcome the presumption that the invoking party 
“agreed to bear any loss occasioned by an event which was foreseeable at the time of 
contracting . . . .”). 
 110. Id. (contrasting the vague and boilerplate clause in Watson Laboratories with the “specific” 
clause in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., which excused specific types of 
government actions); see also E. Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 988 
(5th Cir. 1976) (noting the force majeure clause excused “any act of government . . . affecting 
materials, equipment, facilities or completed aircraft”). 
 111. Watson Lab’ys, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allied-
Gen. Nuclear Servs., 731 F. Supp. 850, 855–56 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting a boilerplate force majeure 
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In this case, the federal district court, applying California law, held that 
the United States Food and Drug Administration’s shutdown of a medical 
drug supply company’s manufacturer could not fall within the enumerated 
event of a “regulatory . . . action.” 112  The court found that the term 
“regulatory action” was too vague to demonstrate that the parties intended 
the shutdown of a manufacturer, a non-party to the contract, to be included. 
113  As the term was too vague and the clause was boilerplate, the court 
imposed the common-law requirement of unforeseeability on the shutdown, 
determined the shutdown was foreseeable, and, thus, that the force majeure 
clause would not excuse contractual nonperformance.114 
One stringent alternative is for courts to require parties to expressly 
include “foreseeable events” within the clause if they intend foreseeable 
events to be included.115  At least one bankruptcy court has embraced this 
alternative.116  This court would only permit foreseeable force majeure events 
to be included when parties specifically include language to that effect in the 
contract.117   
2. The Texas Approach 
A few state courts, including those in Texas and Indiana, have expressly 
adopted an interpretive stance regarding the relationship between common-
law force majeure and its contractual equivalent.118  These courts allow the 
terms of an enumerated force majeure clause to control the scope and 
 
clause invokes a body of common-law analysis, while specific clauses are analyzed like any other 
contractual provision). 
 112. Watson Lab’ys, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1103–05, 1113. 
 113. Id. at 1109, 1113. 
 114. Id. at 1113. 
 115. In re Flying Cow Ranch HC, LLC, No. 18-12681-BKC-MAM, 2018 WL 7500475, at *2 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 22, 2018) (requiring parties to expressly include “foreseeable events” to 
overcome the presumption at common law that force majeure events are unforeseeable). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (“[U]nder Florida law, force majeure clauses that include foreseeable events . . . are 
permissible, [but] such events must be provided for in the language of the contract . . . .”). 
 118. See Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715, 716, 720–
21 (Tex. App. 1987) (holding there is no unforeseeability requirement for a specified force majeure 
condition); Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of South Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2013) (“[T]he scope and effect of a force majeure clause depends on the specific contract language, 
and not on any traditional definition of the term.”). 
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application of a force majeure analysis,119 and permit common-law to fill in 
the gaps left by general exculpatory language, such as in a catch-all phrase.120  
For example, in Kodiak 1981 Partnership v. Delhi Gas Pipeline 
Corp.,121 the Texas Court of Appeals declined to apply an automatic 
unforeseeability requirement when the proposed force majeure event fell 
within an enumerated force majeure event in the contract.122  However, when 
the proposed force majeure event instead falls within the general catch-all 
phrase, the Texas Court of Appeals, in TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips 
Co.,123 held that common law would fill in the gaps and the court would 
impose an unforeseeability requirement.124  
D. COVID-19 Disruptions as a Force Majeure 
As of May, 2021 courts are still in the early stages of interpreting 
whether COVID-19 and its related disruptions constitute force majeure 
events, and few parties have been rewarded relief.125  This is primarily due to 
the difficulty in isolating a particular COVID-19-related disruption that 
directly caused noncompliance to the degree specified in the contract.126  In 
one notable case, In re Republican Party of Texas,127 the Republican State 
Convention of Texas was canceled due to COVID-19.128  While the majority 
opinion did not rely on force majeure, the dissent reasoned that COVID-19 
generally could not constitute a force majeure event, as its ongoing nature 
was contrary to the clause which defined force majeure events as specific 
“occurence[s].”129 
 
 119. Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc., 997 N.E.2d at 27 (“[W]hen the parties have defined the nature 
of force majeure in their agreement, that nature dictates the application, effect, and scope of force 
majeure . . . .” (citing Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998))).  
 120. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. App. 2018) 
(holding the common-law unforeseeability requirement applies to general exculpatory language of 
catch-all phrases). 
 121. 736 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App. 1987). 
 122. Id. at 716, 720–21. 
 123. 555 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App. 2018). 
 124. Id. at 182–83. 
 125. See infra text accompanying notes 126–147. 
 126. See, e.g., Rudolph v. United Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 20 C 2142, 2021 WL 534669,*7 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2021) (noting even if COVID-19 fell within United Airline’s force majeure 
clause, the airline must also prove COVID-19 directly caused the airline to cancel its flights); Future 
St. Ltd. v. Big Belly Solar, LLC, No. 20-cv-11020-DJC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136999, at *20 (D. 
Mass. July 31, 2020) (noting that, even if COVID-19 constituted force majeure, the invoking party 
failed to prove how it caused noncompliance). 
 127. 605 S.W.3d 47 (Tex. 2020). 
 128. Id. at 49 (Devine, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 52. 
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However, multiple courts have held COVID-19 fell within a force 
majeure clause as a “natural disaster.”130  In JN Contemporary Art LLC v. 
Phillips Auctioneers LLC,131 a federal district court in New York considered 
whether the pandemic fell within a force majeure clause that would excuse 
an art auction house’s failure to comply with an agreement to sell a 
painting.132  The district court remarked that “[i]t cannot be seriously disputed 
that the COVID-19 pandemic is a natural disaster.”133  Other courts have 
reached similar conclusions.134  Therefore, recent precedent suggests parties 
with the enumerated term “natural disaster” within their force majeure 
clauses have a greater likelihood of COVID-19 successfully excusing 
noncompliance.135  
Parties have frequently invoked COVID-19-related government-issued 
shutdown orders as a force majeure event.136  However, they have had limited 
success arguing that these orders are force majeure events due to the 
difficulty in demonstrating that the shutdown order itself caused 
noncompliance.137  For instance, in Richards Clearview, LLC v. Bed Bath & 
Beyond, Inc.,138 a federal district court in Louisiana noted the difficulty of 
determining whether a government-issued shutdown order affecting malls 
caused the Bed, Bath & Beyond store to close.139  Although the store was 
located in a mall which was forced to shut down due to the government’s 
order, the Bed, Bath & Beyond store was excluded from the government’s 
order and was not required to close.140  
When the force majeure clause does not require strict impossibility, but 
permits a more lenient standard, courts may have more flexibility in 
 
 130. See infra notes 131–134. 
 131. No. 20CV4370 (DLC), 2020 WL 7405262 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020). 
 132. Id. at *1–7. 
 133. Id. at *7. 
 134. AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels & Resorts One LLC, No. 20-CV-0310, 2020 WL 
7024929, at *58–59 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020) (noting COVID-19 and its effects fits within the 
enumerated term of “calamities” and arguably fits within the enumerated term of a “natural 
disaster”); Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 370 (Pa. 2020) (finding COVID-19 
constituted a “natural disaster” under a Pennsylvania statute). 
 135. See also 1600 Walnut Corp. v. Cole Haan Co. Store, No. 20-4223, 2021 WL 1193100, at 
*3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2021) (finding the pandemic fell within a catch-all phrase as it was similar in 
kind to “other life-altering national events [], such as war, riots, and insurrection”). 
 136. See e.g., In re Cinemex USA Real Est. Holdings, Inc., No. 20-14695-BKC-LMI, 2021 WL 
564486, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2021) (finding force majeure clause excused rental 
payments for movie theatre forced to close by government order).  
 137. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 138–140; 143–146. 
 138. No. 20-1709, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160078, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2020), aff’d on other 
grounds, No. 20-30614, 2021 WL 865310 (5th Cir. 2021) (applying Louisiana law).  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at *5 n.1, n.3. 
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providing relief.141  In In re Hitz Restaurant Group,142 a bankruptcy court 
examined whether the Governor of Illinois’s shutdown order of restaurants, 
which permitted carry-out dining, caused the invoking party’s 
noncompliance.143  The force majeure clause at issue did not require strict 
impossibility.144  Rather, it permitted any force majeure event that “delayed, 
retarded, or hindered” performance to excuse nonperformance.145  Because 
the shutdown order “hindered” in-person dining, which constituted 
approximately three fourths of the restaurant’s square footage, the invoking 
party was excused from three-fourths of its rental obligations.146  In general, 
these cases demonstrate that there are significant obstacles for parties 
invoking COVID-19 as a force majeure event.147 
II. ANALYSIS 
COVID-19 exposes the inevitable clash between presuming the 
common-law definition of force majeure as an unforeseeable event, and 
presuming parties intend the contractual tool of force majeure to exclusively 
control.148  For instance, under the common-law approach, COVID-19 is the 
prototypical example of a force majeure event.149  Indeed, courts are already 
referring to COVID-19 as a force majeure in dicta.150  However, force 
majeure precedent suggests that few parties are likely to obtain relief from 
their contractual obligations due to COVID-19.151  When a once-in-a-century 
pandemic does not constitute a force majeure under most contracts, but 
 
 141. See infra text accompanying notes 142–146. 
 142. 616 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020). 
 143. Id. at 378–79. 
 144. Id. at 376–77. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 377, 379–80. 
 147. See supra text accompanying notes 127–140. 
 148. See infra text accompanying notes 149–154. 
 149. See, e.g., URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 915 F. 
Supp. 1267, 1287 (D.R.I. 1996) (providing cataclysmic examples of force majeure events, such as 
“typhoons, citizens run amok, [and] Hannibal and his elephants at the gates”). 
 150. E.g., Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 770, 779 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he force majeure 
of the pandemic . . . .”); Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 388 (Pa. 2020) (Wecht, 
J., concurring) (calling the convergence of a “once-in-a-century pandemic” and postal delays a 
“force majeure”); Westbury Flats LLC. v. Backer, No. LT-78308-12/KI, 2020 WL 5362063, at *5 
n.2 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 4, 2020) (noting legislation aimed to address the economic downturn caused 
by the “force majeure of Coronavirus Pandemic of 2020”). 
 151. At the time of writing, only one court has permitted some form of relief due to COVID-19 
disruptions.  See In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020) (permitting limited 
relief for a restaurant closure due to a government-issued shutdown order).  Precedent similarly 
suggests that very few parties are likely to be excused for nonperformance.  See supra Section I.A.  
For an analysis of the applicability of COVID-19 as a force majeure event, see infra Section II.C. 
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something as small as a power failure at a wedding does,152 this signals that 
the role of force majeure in modern contract jurisprudence is deeply 
confused.  This Comment posits that this confusion is caused by the 
indiscriminate comingling of the common-law conception of force majeure 
with the contractual tool of the force majeure clause.153  It is, therefore, 
crucial for courts to isolate an interpretative strategy that disentangles these 
intertwined concepts.154 
This Comment advocates for the Court of Appeals of Maryland to adopt 
the strategy employed in Texas and Indiana, which presumes the terms of a 
self-defined force majeure clause are controlling, while relying on common-
law merely to fill in the gaps.155  Under this approach, common law would 
apply when the contract has general exculpatory language, such as within a 
catch-all phrase, or when the contract merely invokes the word force majeure 
and does not enumerate any specific events.156  
First, Section II.A. discusses why the common-law approach is 
flawed.157  Next, Section II.B. highlights the comparative benefits of the 
Texas approach.158  Finally, Section II.C. argues that the Texas approach is 
the ideal strategy to use in interpreting COVID-19 as a force majeure 
event.159  This is due in part to the unique qualities of COVID-19, as a 
widespread and temporally extended event.160  The Texas approach is 
meritorious, as it provides certainty to parties while avoiding the unnecessary 
expenditure of resources and time that would likely occur in disputing 
whether COVID-19 constitutes a foreseeable event.161  
A. The Common-Law Approach Results in Illogical Consequences, 
Deviates from the Ordinary Meaning Canon of Construction, and 
Relies Too Heavily on Legal Formalism. 
This Section will argue that the common-law approach results in: (1) the 
illogical consequence of requiring enumerated force majeure events to be 
 
 152. See Facto v. Pantagis, 915 A.2d 59, 60–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding a 
power failure at a wedding constitutes force majeure under an agreement which explicitly lists 
power failure as a type of force majeure). 
 153. See infra Sections II.A., II.B. (comparing whether common-law conceptions of force 
majeure or the contractual force majeure clause should control). 
 154. See infra Sections II.B., II.C. 
 155. See infra Sections II.B., II.C. 
 156. See supra note 120. 
 157. See infra Section II.A. 
 158. See infra Section II.B. 
 159. See infra Section II.C. 
 160. See infra text accompanying notes 221–231. 
 161. See infra Section II.C.  
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unforeseeable; (2) an unjustifiably high bar to overcome the common-law 
presumption, which deviates from the ordinary meaning canon of 
construction; and (3) a heavy reliance on legal formalism that may not align 
with the parties’ ultimate intent.162  
One of the principal cases on this side of the jurisdictional divide,163 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,164 articulated an 
early reliance on the common-law definition of force majeure.165  However, 
such reliance on the common-law definition to interpret an enumerated force 
majeure event results in illogical consequences.166  The mere fact that parties 
include a list of enumerated events in a force majeure clause demonstrates 
that they foresaw the occurrence of the enumerated events at the creation of 
the contract.167  To require enumerated events to also be unforeseeable is to 
require a logical impossibility.168  If this unforeseeability requirement is taken 
seriously, it would effectively nullify enumerated events, which were all 
technically foreseeable, as evidenced by their contemplation and inclusion in 
the contract.169  To reconcile this, courts would need to draw a line between 
foreseeable events that are so unlikely to occur that they are included as 
enumerated events, and foreseeable events that are likely to occur and 
 
 162. See infra notes 164–189. 
 163. See, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 182 (Tex. App. 2018) 
(referring to Gulf Oil Corp. as representative of one side of this debate); see also Kodiak 1981 
Drilling P’ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex. App. 1987) (rejecting Gulf 
Oil Corp., as directly contrary to Texas and Fifth Circuit precedent). 
 164. 706 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 165. Id. at 452.  To support this reasoning, the Third Circuit relied entirely on the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Brooks-Calloway Co.  Id.  However, the Third 
Circuit’s reliance on this Supreme Court precedent was in error because Brooks-Calloway Co. 
involved a force majeure clause that specifically required all enumerated force majeure events be 
“unforeseeable.”  United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120, 121 n.1 (1943).  Yet, the 
clause in Gulf Oil Corp. did not include an explicit unforeseeability requirement.  Gulf Oil Corp., 
706 F.2d at 456 n.8. 
 166. See infra text accompanying notes 167–171; see also Jay D. Kelley, So What’s Your 
Excuse? An Analysis of Force Majeure Claims, 2 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 91, 102 (2007) 
(characterizing the Gulf Oil Corp. court’s interpretation as “unduly restrictive”). 
 167. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 288 n.4 (Tex. App. 1998) (“[I]n naming 
specific force majeure events in the clause[,] the parties undoubtedly foresaw the possibility that 
they could occur, and that is why they enumerated them to begin with.”). 
 168. Id. (“Indeed, to imply an unforeseeability requirement into a force majeure clause would be 
unreasonable.”). 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 167. 
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therefore, cannot constitute force majeure.170  This approach necessitates 
contorting the concept of foreseeability just to remain logically cogent.171 
An alternative articulation of the common-law approach, adopted in 
Watson Laboratories Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc,172 must also be 
rejected.  This strategy presumes the common-law definition applies173 and 
discounts boilerplate clauses as fundamentally incapable of demonstrating 
that the parties intended their force majeure clause to overcome the common-
law presumption.174  By rejecting boilerplate language as wholly 
inapplicable, the court in Watson Laboratories set a high bar for the words 
on the page to overcome the common-law presumption.175 
For instance, if the disputed enumerated term is “government 
interventions,” the Watson Laboratories court would assess whether the 
clause appeared bargained-for by considering whether the clause appeared 
specific or tailored to the parties.176  A sufficiently specific clause in the eyes 
of the Watson Laboratories court, under this example, would likely require 
precise reference to types of government interventions the parties anticipated, 
such as denial of permits, delays in licensing, etcetera.177  However, this 
specificity requirement is unlikely to be a successful long-term strategy, as it 
creates perverse incentives for parties in these jurisdictions to simply modify 
and lengthen their boilerplate language in order to demonstrate specificity.178  
In that sense, this strategy simply kicks the can further down the road. 
 
 170. See Watson Lab’ys, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1113–14 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (distinguishing the “boilerplate” language of “regulatory, 
governmental . . . action,” which bears a foreseeable possibility of occurring, from other 
enumerated events that are “so unlikely to occur” as to make them “qualitatively different.”). 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
 172. 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 173. Id. at 1113 (holding defendants failed to overcome the presumption that the invoking party 
“agreed to bear any loss occasioned by an event which was foreseeable at the time of 
contracting . . . .”). 
 174. Id. at 1110; see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v Allied-Gen. Nuclear Servs., 731 F. Supp. 
850, 855–56 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting boilerplate necessitates a common-law analysis, while specific 
clauses are analyzed as any other contractual provision). 
 175. See Watson Lab’ys, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1113 (holding a force majeure clause excusing 
regulatory actions, among many other types of events, was too vague). 
 176. Id. (contrasting the vague and boilerplate clause in Watson Laboratories with the “specific” 
clause in Eastern Airlines, which excused specific types of government actions); see also E. Air 
Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 988 (5th Cir. 1976) (analyzing force majeure 
clause excusing “any act of government . . . affecting materials, equipment, facilities or completed 
aircraft”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. (noting that the contrast between Eastern Airlines and Watson Laboratories instructs 
contracting parties in California on precisely how to contract for more protective force majeure 
clauses). 
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There are also serious flaws in the most stringent articulation of the 
common-law approach, adopted by a bankruptcy court in Florida.179  This 
articulation requires that parties expressly include foreseeable events within 
the force majeure clause if they intend foreseeable events to be included.180  
Under such a stringent rule, the court does not give credence to evidence that 
the parties intended their clause to exclusively control.181  Such a rule would 
not consider the length, the specificity, or evidence that the parties had 
bargained for the terms of their particular clause.  Even a five-page, 
bargained-for force majeure clause would not indicate the parties intended 
the terms on the page to control under such a stringent rule.182  This 
interpretation is contrary to the ordinary meaning canon of construction, 
which calls for the interpretation of words in their ordinary meaning, unless 
the context indicates they bear a technical sense.183  Force majeure’s 
“ordinary . . . meaning” at common law undoubtedly requires 
unforeseeability;184 however, a list of enumerated events may indicate a term 
bears a technical sense within the agreement.185   
One rejoinder to this is that when parties place so much emphasis on the 
force majeure clause as to write a lengthy provision, they should have been 
so thorough as to include “foreseeable” events within the clause, if that was 
their ultimate intent.186  However, considering the lack of precedent 
surrounding force majeure interpretation, and widespread confusion due to 
the indiscriminate comingling of its common-law and the contractual 
understandings, it is unclear that contracting parties reasonably would have 
known to include these “magic words” within the clause.187  Similarly, it is 
unclear whether parties reasonably would have intended the force majeure 
 
 179. In re Flying Cow Ranch HC, LLC, No. 18-12681-BKC-MAM, 2018 WL 7500475, at *2 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 22, 2018). 
 180. See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text. 
 181. See In re Flying Cow Ranch HC, LLC, 2018 WL 7500475, at *2 (requiring specific 
language of “foreseeable events” if the parties intend foreseeable events to be included). 
 182. Id. 
 183. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 69 (2012). 
 184. See URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 915 F. Supp. 
1267, 1281, 1287 (D.R.I. 1996) (“[F]orce majeure clauses have traditionally applied to unforeseen 
circumstances . . . .”). 
 185. See, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 181 (Tex. App. 2018) 
(“A term’s common-law meaning will not override the definition given to a contractual term by the 
contracting parties.”) 
 186. See supra note 173. 
 187. See supra note 6. 
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provision to impose an unforeseeability requirement.188  Therefore, this 
heavy reliance on legal formalism poses troubling consequences.  While it 
may have benefits of certainty and ease of administrability, it may prove ill-
equipped to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is the ultimate goal of 
contract interpretation.189 
B. The Texas Approach Aligns with the Ordinary Meaning Canon of 
Construction and Provides Certainty to Contracting Parties and 
Courts. 
The Texas approach aligns with the ordinary meaning canon of 
construction, as it permits terms which bear a technical sense in the contract 
to control.190  This approach is not burdened with the oxymoronic conundrum 
of requiring foreseeable enumerated events to also be unforeseeable.191  Nor 
does this approach create perverse incentives, as parties are not incentivized 
to write extremely long and detailed clauses to satisfy some “specificity” 
requirement under the Watson Laboratories approach.192   
Additionally, the Texas approach best effectuates the parties’ intent.193  
The mere fact that force majeure clauses have developed into such a 
widespread contractual tool that they are now known as boilerplate194 
supports the notion that common-law force majeure has, to some extent, 
“fallen by the wayside.”195  It is reasonable to acknowledge that when parties 
use a boilerplate contractual tool, their intention is to use a contractual tool.  
Indeed, it is counterintuitive to presume that in using a boilerplate contractual 
tool, the parties intended to invoke a body of common law, particularly when 
such an interpretation may muddy their ability to rely on the contractual 
provisions they specifically included.196 
 
 188. See E. Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 991 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(noting that due to the uncertainty surrounding the force majeure clause, parties had “good reason” 
to resort to general contractual language).  
 189. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 190. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, supra note 183 (describing the “ordinary 
meaning” canon of construction). 
 191. See supra text accompany notes 166–171.  
 192. See supra text accompanying note 178. 
 193. See supra note 38. 
 194. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allied-Gen. Nuclear Servs., 731 F. Supp. 850, 855 
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (referring to a force majeure clause as “boilerplate”). 
 195. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 196. See id. (noting that imposing common law on a self-defined force majeure would “rewrite 
the contract”). 
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Courts that discount boilerplate language197 fail to recognize that 
parties’ may intentionally choose to rely on boilerplate language.198  Parties 
can, and do, intentionally choose to include boilerplate language, often due 
to reasoned judgments regarding time and costs.199  A court should not 
presume that language parties deemed sufficient to rely upon is not indicative 
of the parties’ intent.200  To do so is tantamount to “rewrit[ing] the contract 
or interpret[ing] it in a manner which the parties never intended.”201  Courts 
that utilize principles of objective contract interpretation, such as those in 
Maryland, should rely on the words of the contract as the closest 
approximation of a parties’ intent when the term “force majeure” is self-
defined within the contract by the enumerated events.202 
Finally, the Texas approach does not open a floodgate of force majeure 
litigation; rather, it effectively maintains force majeure’s status as a narrow 
exception to the general rule that parties are required to perform their 
promises unconditionally.203  The Texas approach therefore aligns with the 
underlying purpose of force majeure at common law, but it does so by relying 
on objective principles of contract interpretation. 
This approach is just as successful as alternative approaches in ensuring 
force majeure remains a narrow exception, but it does so without creating the 
illogical result of requiring foreseeable events to also be unforeseeable. 204  
For instance, in the case of an enumerated force majeure clause, any “force 
majeure” event must fit within an enumerated term or within the catch-all 
 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 174. 
 198. See supra text accompanying note 174. 
 199. See Jeremiah T. Reynolds, Defending Boilerplate in Contracts, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2008, at 
10 (noting that although boilerplate contractual tools get a “bad rap,” they drastically reduce 
transaction costs and permit parties to rely on standard language with reasonable assurances of how 
the language will be interpreted). 
 200. See id. (noting significant reasons parties rely on boilerplate contractual tools, including the 
fact that the lack of critical boilerplate provisions may mean the difference between winning and 
losing a contractual dispute). 
 201. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 202. See Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 198, 892 A.2d 520, 526 (Md. 2006) (“We have long 
adhered to the objective theory of contract interpretation, giving effect to the clear terms of 
agreements, regardless of the intent of the parties at the time of contract formation.”).  This view is 
most consistent with respecting the autonomy of contracting parties.  See Alan Schwartz & Robert 
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 567–68 (2003) 
(describing contract interpretation’s goal as effectuating the parties’ intent, which follows from 
respecting the autonomy of drafters). 
 203. See infra text accompanying notes 204–210; see also Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 
519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) (noting force majeure under common law provides a narrow 
defense). 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 166–171.  
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provision under the limiting ejusdem generis doctrine.205  Additionally, a 
proposed force majeure event would be further limited by other contractual 
clauses as the court would read the contract as a harmonious whole,206 
without casting out any meaningful provision of the contract.207  Furthermore, 
even if a clause fits within the definition of a “force majeure” event as defined 
in the contract, the invoking party still bears the burden of proving the event 
caused noncompliance.208  The Court of Appeals can interpret this quite 
strictly to only permit force majeure events that bear a direct relationship to 
the noncompliance.209  Finally, the Court of Appeals may choose to consider 
notice requirements strictly, such that failure to comply is fatal to the force 
majeure defense.210 
The Watson Laboratories case provides another example of why the 
Texas approach is meritorious.  This case would likely have resulted in the 
same outcome under the Texas approach, but without injecting confusing 
specificity requirements.211  For instance, a Texas court would likely have 
considered a regulatory action against a non-party to the contract to “fit” 
within the term regulatory event under the contract.212  However, it likely 
would have found that the United States Food and Drug Administration’s 
shutdown of a non-party was not the proximate cause of the invoking party’s 
non-compliance.213  Rather, the proximate cause would likely have been the 
invoking party’s failure to take steps to mitigate the occurrence, to find an 
 
 205. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 185–86 (Tex. App. 2018) 
(applying ejusdem generis to a catch-all force majeure provision). 
 206. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Hunt Petroleum (AEC), Inc., 157 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)). 
 207. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 286–88 (Tex. App. 1998) (reading the force 
majeure clause in light of the habendum clause). 
 208. Sherwin Alumina L.P. v AluChem, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (holding 
mere increase in price to upgrade equipment did not prevent compliance). 
 209. See, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 886 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2015) (holding Chinese market manipulations of solar panels did not constitute a force 
majeure as the government’s actions did not directly cause the invoking party’s noncompliance). 
 210. See Sabine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1168 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (“The 
failure to give proper notice is fatal to a defense based upon a force majeure clause requiring 
notice.”). 
 211. See infra text accompanying notes 212–214. 
 212. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 181, 193 (Tex. App. 2018) 
(citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005)) (noting enumerated 
events are analyzed under their ordinary meaning, unless the context indicates they bear a technical 
sense). 
 213. See Sherwin Alumina L.P. v AluChem, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 957, 973 n.30 (S.D. Tex. 
2007) (rejecting the argument that the burden of upgrading equipment prevented noncompliance); 
see also Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 743 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Tex. App. 1987) 
(“[A] contractual obligation cannot be avoided simply because performance has become more 
economically burdensome than a party anticipated.”). 
  
2021] FORCE MAJEURE AND THE CORONAVIRUS 823 
 
alternative manufacturer, or to secure an adequate stockpile of the 
pharmaceutical products their manufacturer could no longer produce due to 
the shutdown.214   
Therefore, the Court of Appeals should adopt the Texas approach, 
which permits self-defined force majeure clauses to control the scope and 
applicability of the analysis, while permitting common-law notions of force 
majeure to fill in the gaps.215  This approach aligns with the ordinary meaning 
canon of construction,216 it avoids illogical consequences of requiring 
enumerated events to be unforeseeable,217 while respecting parties’ freedom 
to contract,218 and it aligns with the underlying goal of force majeure to 
remain a narrow exception to contractual obligations.219  
C. COVID-19 Under the Two Approaches 
This Section demonstrates that the Texas approach is the superior 
interpretive strategy to employ in considering whether COVID-19 constitutes 
a force majeure event within a contract, as it maintains force majeure’s status 
as a narrow exception to the general rule that parties must perform their 
promises absolutely, even during an ongoing and wide-spread event like the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Additionally, the Texas approach is meritorious as it 
avoids expending judicial time and resources on tangential questions of 
whether the pandemic was a foreseeable occurrence. 
1. The Texas Approach Maintains Force Majeure’s Status as a 
Narrow Exception Even During the Widespread and Ongoing 
COVID-19 Pandemic. 
The Texas approach ensures force majeure remains a narrow exception, 
even when COVID-19 is the invoked force majeure event.220  This is because 
COVID-19 will be difficult to conceptualize and apply as a singular “event,” 
and therefore it will be challenging for parties to demonstrate the pandemic 
 
 214. Valero Transmission Co., 743 S.W.2d at 663. 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 190–196. 
 216. See supra text accompany notes 183–185. 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 166–169. 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 196–202. 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 204–214. 
 220. A court will analyze whether COVID-19 fits within an enumerated event in the contract, or 
the catch-all phrase.  See supra text accompanying note 46.  Some parties may have the term 
“pandemic,” “epidemic,” or a catch-all phrase with similar enumerated events within their contracts.  
Scott M. Kessler & Shane O’Connell, Mitigating the Effect of Event Cancellations During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, N.Y. ST. B.J., June/July 2020, at 31–32.  Some parties may try to include 
COVID-19 within other general categories like disaster, act of God, or causality.  See Andrew A. 
Schwartz, Contracts and COVID-19, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 57 (2020) (discussing COVID-
19 as an “Act of God”). 
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was the cause of their noncompliance.221  First, the problem of 
conceptualizing a temporally extended pandemic as a singular event is 
particularly relevant when there are notice obligations that require, for 
instance, notice of force majeure invocation within a certain number of days 
after the event’s occurrence.222  Under a notice requirement, parties would 
need to explain when precisely COVID-19 started preventing 
noncompliance.  This is so because the start and end dates are crucial for 
determining the duration of the event, for which contractual duties may be 
suspended.223  
The Texas Supreme Court has already flagged this as an issue in In re 
Republican Party of Texas,224 in which parties cited COVID-19 as a force 
majeure to justify the closure of an arena that contracted to host the Texas 
Republican Convention.225  While the state supreme court’s majority did not 
address the contractual issue,226 the dissent engaged in a thorough force 
majeure analysis that may signal how Texas courts may interpret COVID-
19.227  In that case, the force majeure clause required the invoking party to 
notify the other party of the force majeure “occurrence” within seven days of 
the “occurrence.”228  The dissent noted that the parties’ pleadings did not 
identify any “occurrence,” other than the ongoing issue of COVID-19.229  The 
dissent also noted that COVID-19 is a problematic “event” because it is 
temporally extended.230  Because the parties could not point to a singular, 
distinct “occurrence,” the dissent reasoned they could not comply with the 
notice requirement.231  Second, the dissent signaled that COVID-19 as a force 
 
 221. See infra text accompanying notes 228–242. 
 222. See, e.g., In re Republican Party of Tex., 605 S.W.3d 47, 52 (Tex. 2020) (Devine, J., 
dissenting) (analyzing whether COVID-19 can be the triggering event when the contract required 
notice within seven days). 
 223. Parties may argue the World Health Organization’s declaration of COVID-19 as a 
pandemic on March 11, 2020, indicated the “start.”  Transcript of Virtual Press Conference on 
COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/ 
default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-audio-emergencies-coronavirus-press-conference-
full-and-final-11mar2020.pdf?sfvrsn=cb432bb3_2. 
 224. In re Republican Party of Tex., 605 S.W.3d at 47. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 48. 
 227. Id. at 48, 49–54 (Devine, J., dissenting). 
 228. Id. at 52. 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. (“The coronavirus pandemic has been an ongoing public-health concern. . . . [I]t has not 
been—and cannot be—boxed in as a single, distinct occurrence.”).  Similarly, the court noted that 
the parties could not identify when COVID-19 began as a pandemic under the contract.  Id. 
 231. Id. (“A reasonable reader . . . would thus be puzzled on how to follow the seven-days’ 
notice requirement if one cannot pin down the occurrence to a specific calendar day.”). 
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majeure event is problematic because of the causation analysis.232  The 
dissent emphasized that compliance was possible because there were ways to 
perform the contract, such as by catering to public safety measures.233 
Additionally, there are serious directness concerns due to the nature of 
a viral epidemic that gradually spreads, in conjunction with human and 
governmental decisions about how to respond to the epidemic.234  In essence, 
there are many events and actors between the inception of COVID-19 in 
Wuhan, China to the virus somehow preventing compliance for one or both 
parties to the contract.235  In Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, 
LLC,236 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that even one degree of 
separation between the force majeure event and noncompliance was too 
indirect.237  Here there are innumerous degrees of separation between the 
event’s inception to the invoking party’s noncompliance.238  Additionally, as 
economic downturns are insufficient bases for a force majeure claim,239 the 
economic downturn due to COVID-19 is unlikely to be a sufficient nexus.240  
Under the Texas approach, therefore, COVID-19 is unlikely to be successful 
in most cases to excuse noncompliance under a force majeure clause.241  
If parties can pinpoint particular events that prevent compliance, 
however, it is more likely that the Texas approach will excuse the parties’ 
nonperformance.242  Although contracts that include government interference 
as a force majeure event have the greatest likelihood for successful 
 
 232. Id. at 47, 53. 
 233. Id. at 52–53. 
 234. Paul K. Stafford, Coping with COVID-19: Business & Insurance Considerations for the 
Virus that Made America Virtual, 18 J. TEX. INS. L. 3, 3–4 (2020).  While there may be a temptation 
to adopt a more lenient directness test out of concern for parties negatively affected by COVID-19, 
courts should refrain from altering force majeure’s narrow directness test, and instead rely on 
already existing doctrines in equity when appropriate and necessary.  See infra text accompanying 
note 256. 
 235. A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AJMC (Jan. 1, 2021), 
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020. 
 236. 86 N.W.2d 445 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015). 
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 65–68. 
 238. See supra text accompany note 235. 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
 240. Robert L. Gegios & Lance Duroni, The Legal Domino Effect: COVID-19 & Contracts, 93 
WIS. LAW. 12, 13 (2020) (noting the difficulties of proving COVID-19 caused an economic 
downturn due to human intervention).  However, there may be openings for parties who suffered a 
greatly depleted work force due to COVID-19 infections, or for parties who were directly 
incapacitated due to COVID-19.  See id. (observing that direct impact from COVID-19 supports 
causation analysis). 
 241. See supra text accompanying notes 221–240. 
 242. See supra notes 230–231. 
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invocation,243 the United States government’s response to the pandemic has 
hindered contracting parties from claiming government intervention as the 
cause of their noncompliance.244  For instance, proclamations of public health 
emergencies are insufficient to cause noncompliance, as they do not prevent 
a business from engaging in commercial activity to meet their contractual 
obligations.245  Similarly, mere recommendations to institute social 
distancing measures, to avoid nonessential travel, to wear a mask, etcetera 
are also likely insufficient to cause noncompliance.246   
The strongest case for a successful force majeure defense likely involves 
a government-issued shutdown order.247  However, even those orders are 
strictly construed, and many of the shutdown orders have carved out 
exceptions limiting the number of parties that are actually compelled to shut 
down.248  For instance, in Richards Clearview, LLC v. Bed, Bath & Beyond, 
Inc.,249 a federal district court in Louisiana considered whether a government 
shutdown order caused Bed, Bath & Beyond to shut down, or whether Bed, 
Bath & Beyond fell into an exception to the order and closed down 
voluntarily.250   The district court held the store’s closure was voluntary, as 
the store was excluded from the closure mandate.251  Voluntary closures 
 
 243. See, e.g., Richard J. Nogal & Brian M. Dougherty, Illinois Contract Law on Force Majeure, 
Impossibility, Impracticability and Commercial Frustration in the Age of Covid-19, 32 DCBA 
BRIEF 10, 12 (2020) (noting government orders as a cogent argument for force majeure). 
 244. This leads to a somewhat ironic consequence, as states which wanted to encourage 
economic growth by delaying government shutdown orders have made it more difficult for parties 
within these jurisdictions to invoke force majeure.  See supra text accompanying note 243. 
 245. See In re Republican Party of Tex., 605 S.W.3d 47, 53 (Tex. 2020) (Devine, J., dissenting) 
(noting social distancing recommendations did not make compliance impossible). 
 246. There may be slight flexibility here if the contract requires less than impossibility and 
permits inadvisability.  But see OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 
1214, 1224 (D. Haw. 2003) (rejecting argument that the 9/11 terrorist attack and the resulting travel 
disturbances made compliance inadvisable because the cancelled event occurred five months after 
the attack). 
 247. Paul K. Stafford, Coping with COVID-19: Business and Insurance Considerations for the 
Virus that Made America Virtual, 18 J. TEX. INS. L. 3, 4 (2020) (noting damages that result from 
actions of civil authorities may trigger contractual or insurance protection as a force majeure). 
 248. See Brodie H. Smith, Beyond Force Majeure and Frustration of Purpose: How Else to 
Defend a Contract Claim Based on the COVID-19 Pandemic, 62 ORANGE CNTY. LAW. 32, 33 (June 
2020), http://www.virtualonlineeditions.com/publication/?i=661043&p=34 (noting the number of 
exceptions to the California stay-at-home order “threaten[s] to swallow the [o]rder”).  
 249. No. CV 20-1709, 2020 WL 5229494 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2020), aff’d on other grounds, No. 
20-30614, 2021 WL 865310 (5th Cir. 2021).  
 250. Id. at *1–6; see also In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. 374, 378–79 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020) 
(holding a restaurant still had to pay partial rent because it was not forced to close entirely, as it was 
able to continue carry-out dining). 
 251. Richards Clearview, LLC, 2020 WL 5229494, at *6. 
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frustrate a force majeure defense because, generally, a party’s voluntary acts 
and omissions may not constitute force majeure.252   
The Texas approach provides certainty to parties, as they will be able to 
assess whether force majeure defenses are prudent.253  As this analysis 
indicates, the Texas approach does not open a floodgate of parties being 
excused from their obligations.254  Instead, this approach provides clarity, 
guidance, and reasonably narrow limits on when a party should be permitted 
to avoid compliance with their obligations.255  There are other common-law 
defenses parties may rely on for leniency, which are conceptually preferable 
as they do not result in contorting the interpretation of force majeure as a 
contractual tool in the name of equity.256 
2. Imposing the Common-Law Unforeseeability Requirement During 
COVID-19 Goes Down the Rabbit Hole of Litigating Whether the 
Pandemic was “Foreseeable.” 
COVID-19 exposes why an interpretive strategy that presumptively 
imposes an unforeseeability requirement on force majeure events is 
undesirable.257  Under this interpretation, parties who are able to invoke 
COVID-19 due to a “pandemic,” “quarantine,” “disaster,” or other similar 
language may need to argue COVID-19 was an unforeseeable event.258  The 
purpose of force majeure at common law was to create a narrow exception 
for parties to escape contractual obligations.259  A court that classifies the 
pandemic as unforeseeable, may inadvertently open the floodgates for large 
hordes of parties to be excused for their nonperformance, as nearly every 
contracting party in the United States faced the same global pandemic.260  The 
same is true for government-issued shutdown orders, which have been 
 
 252. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
 253. See, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1331 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(upholding a trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees to the opposing party, as the invoking 
party brought a claim with no basis in caselaw). 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 204–210. 
 255. See supra text accompanying notes 241–253. 
 256. See Gegios & Duroni, supra note 240, at 14 (noting force majeure litigation “will make for 
difficult decisions, as courts grapple with key issues of respect for agreed contract language versus 
recognition of the horrific and unforeseen effects of COVID-19 on blameless parties”).  
 257. See infra text accompanying notes 260. 
 258. See supra text accompany note 97. 
 259. See supra text accompanying note 38.  
 260. Gegios & Duroni, supra note 240 at 13 (noting “all businesses are facing a new reality of 
supply disruptions, decreased demand for products and services, governmental prohibitions, and 
strains on their ability to use or maintain workers”). 
  
828 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:799 
 
instituted in almost every state.261  Courts will likely attempt to limit the 
floodgate effect by honing-in on the causation analysis or focusing on 
whether compliance was actually impossible.  In this case, the 
unforeseeability analysis does not appear to be doing any of the work of 
limiting an event’s applicability to the clause.262 
There are additional administrability concerns that are likely to arise in 
debating whether COVID-19 is a foreseeable occurrence, as there will likely 
be extremely creative legal arguments that take up a court’s time.263  Will it 
matter, for instance, if SARS, Swine Flu, and other similar epidemics have 
affected the United States?264  Will it matter that government agencies exist 
for the specific purpose of responding to pandemics?265  Will it matter that 
scientists have been warning for years that a global pandemic was 
imminent?266  Alternatively, will it be more persuasive that this is a once-in-
a-century pandemic and is the prototypical example of a force majeure?267  
For contracts created during the COVID-19 crisis, would COVID-19 still be 
unforeseeable for a contract made directly after the first case was publicized 
in Wuhan, China?268 If so, at what point exactly would the virus cross over 
from an unforeseeable event to a foreseeable event?269  
The most important question is this: Are these abstract questions the 
ideal way for courts to analyze which of the contracting parties should bear 
the loss?  These questions do none of the work in limiting the applicability 
of COVID-19 to a clause, as courts would need to rely on proximate-cause 
 
 261. See Amanda Moreland, et al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-Home 
Orders and Changes in Population Movement — United States, March 1–May 31, 2020, 69 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1198, 1198 (Sept. 4, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a2.htm (noting from March to May alone, 
forty-two U.S. states issued stay-at-home orders). 
 262. See, e.g., Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) (noting 
force majeure under common law provides a narrow defense). 
 263. See infra text accompanying notes 264–267. 
 264. Paul K. Stafford, Coping with COVID-19: Business & Insurance Considerations for the 
Virus that Made America Virtual, 18 J. TEX. INS. L. 3, 3 (2020) (noting the last “pandemic” 
declaration from the World Health Organization was the Swine Flu in 2009). 
 265. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN 
(2005), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/professionals/hhspandemicinfluenzaplan.pdf (detailing the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services’ pandemic influenza plan).  
 266. Betsy McKay & Phred Dvorak, A Deadly Coronavirus Was Inevitable. Why Was No One 
Ready?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-deadly-
coronavirus-was-inevitable-why-was-no-one-ready-for-covid-11597325213 (noting that scientists 
warned for decades of a dangerous pathogen that would likely originate in animals). 
 267. See supra text and accompanying note 149.  
 268. See Emadaldin Abdelrahman, The Egyptian Construction Industry During Covid-19, 15 
CONSTR. L. INT’L 42, 45 (Sept. 2020) (predicting for contracts executed in January 2020, when the 
city of Wuhan was fully quarantined, COVID-19 may have been foreseeable). 
 269. Id. 
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analyses or degree-of-interference analyses in order to avoid a floodgate 
effect.270  These questions therefore operate as tempting rabbit holes, with 
none of the net benefits of narrowing which parties may obtain relief, creating 
clarity for parties, or alleviating the administrative load that is anticipated in 
the wake of COVID-19.271 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland should adopt the Texas approach in 
construing force majeure clauses.272  This approach presumes parties intend 
a force majeure clause with enumerated events to exclusively control, while 
permitting common law to act as a gap filler for general exculpatory language 
and catch-all phrases.273  The Texas approach is conceptually superior to the 
common-law approach generally and for interpreting COVID-19-related 
disruptions in contractual performance.  
The Texas approach is preferable to the common-law approach, as it 
avoids oxymoronic consequences of requiring foreseeable events to also be 
unforeseeable274 by aligning with the ordinary meaning canon of 
construction.275  It also avoids confusing specificity requirements,276 respects 
boilerplate language out of a respect for freedom of contract,277 and avoids a 
strict, formalist requirement that parties use “magic words” to overcome the 
common-law presumption.278  
Finally, the Texas approach is also is the best method for interpreting 
COVID-19 and its related disruptions as force majeure events.279  This 
approach avoids opening up the rabbit hole of whether the pandemic was 
foreseeable, which is likely to take up valuable judicial resources with very 
little net benefit.280  The Texas approach can most effectively respond to 
widespread and ongoing events, such as COVID-19, while avoiding concerns 
of a floodgate effect, present under the common-law approach.281  Finally this 
approach provides much needed certainty to parties and courts, not only in 
 
 270. See supra text accompanying note 258. 
 271. See supra text accompanying notes 263–270. 
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 155–156. 
 273. See supra Section II.B. 
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 166–171. 
 275. See supra Section II.B. 
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 177–179. 
 277. See supra note 203. 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 187–190. 
 279. See supra Section II.C. 
 280. See supra text accompanying notes 264–270. 
 281. See supra Section II.C.1.  
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interpreting COVID-19-related disruptions, but also in interpreting force 
majeure clauses in a post COVID-19 world.282 
 
 282. See supra Section II. 
